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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF THE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT ON INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS: THREE ESSAYS 
JUN WU, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 
Dissertation Directed by: 
Professors Shaomin Li, David D. Selover and George O. White III 
Department of Management 
College of Business & Public Administration 
We examine how governance environment affects business activities across countries. 
Using an updated framework of governance environments, we classify countries into 
three groups based on their dominant modes of governance: (1) rule-based (strong rule of 
law), (2) relation-based (weak rule of law and strong informal network based on private 
relations), and (3) neither-based (absence of both public rules and private network). We 
then examine how different governance types affect trade patterns and foreign investment 
flows. Chapter 2 theoretically proposes that the governance environment of a society 
plays a significant role in influencing international trade and foreign investment across 
countries. Chapter 3 examines how different governance types affect trade patterns 
among 44 countries. Overall, we find that rule-based countries trade more than relation-
based or neither-based countries. A large positive effect on trade flows exists between 
two highly rule-based countries and between two relation-based countries. Any trade 
relationship involving a neither-based country negatively affects trade flows, even 
between two neither-based countries. In Chapter 4, we examine how different governance 
types affect foreign investment flows among 44 countries. We find that rule-based 
countries attract the lowest amount of FDI relative to total amount of foreign investment, 
and they have the largest stock market size relative to their economies. 
This thesis is among the first to introduce the third category of governance— 
neither-based governance. This advancement will contribute to both the institution and 
political economy literature. Using the updated framework of governance to explore trade 
and foreign investment patterns of many countries, especially of those relatively 
undeveloped countries, will contribute the international business literature. In addition to 
academic contributions, this study provides important policy implications to those 
neither-based countries. We suggest that in considering trade and foreign investment 
policies, governments should pay close attention to the governance environments to 
evaluate their own and their partners' situations when conducting international business 
such as trade and foreign investment. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the 1990s, more and more scholars have come to realize that institutions 
matter (North, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutions are "the rules 
of game in a society" (North, 1990: 3). Institutional environments include cognitive, 
normative, and regulatory structures and activities which provide stability and meaning to 
social behavior in a particular society (Delios, Xu and Beamish, 2005; Scott, 1995; Wan 
and Hoskisson, 2003; White, 2006; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Institution is a broad and 
complicated concept. Shuhe Li and his colleagues (Shuhe Li, 1999; Shaomin Li, Park, 
and Shuhe Li, 2004) proposed a relatively concise and powerful typology of institutional 
governance environment—the two-category framework of governance environments 
(rule-based versus relation-based). However, it is too simple to categorize all governance 
into these two categories. This two-category framework is far enough to cover all 
countries (Shaomin Li, 2009). 
Some countries have neither effective public ordering nor extensive social network. 
They cannot be categorized into neither rule-based nor relation-based governance. 
Therefore, it is called neither-based1 governance (Li, 2009). This dissertation builds on Li 
(2009) to expand the three-category framework of governance environments. We take 
use of institutional theory and transaction cost perspectives to interpret the theoretical 
logic of different governance and the role of extended particularized trust, which is the 
differentiator of relation-based and neither-based governance. 
Since the 1990s, scholars have come to realize that institutions play an important 
role in many perspectives, including international business (Ederington, Levinson and 
1
 We will explain it in more detail in a later chapter and we use it with "family-based" interchangeably. 
2 
Minier, 2005), industry structure (Li et al, 2004), organizational changes (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996), strategies (Peng, 2003), and organization structures (Judge and Li, 2008). 
We are very interested in the influence of institutions on international business. On one 
side, this new third-category governance (neither-based) includes the largest number of 
countries and many relatively undeveloped countries belong to this group (Li, 2009). 
These relatively undeveloped countries will benefit a lot from international business. On 
the other side, there are many countries, mostly, neither-based countries, which do not 
conduct international business as much as rule-based and relation-based countries do. 
For example, on average, neither-based countries trade less than one quarter of what rule-
based countries trade2. Why does this happen? Therefore, this dissertation is to explore 
how institutional governance environments, especially, rule-based, relation-based and 
neither-based governance, affect international business such as international trade and 
foreign investment patterns. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 theoretically 
introduces this three-category governance framework and proposes its influence on 
international trade and foreign investment. Chapter 3 empirically examines why some 
countries trade more, some trade less, and some trade almost nothing, and empirically 
examines how the three-category governance framework affects international trade. 
Similarly, we empirically examine how three-category framework explains differences in 
foreign investment across countries in Chapter 4. 
2
 Please see Table 3 for more detail. 
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Chapter 2: Effects of Governance Environments on International Trade and 
Foreign Investment: A Contingency Perspective Based on Particularized Trust 
2.1 Introduction 
Institutions are "the rules of game in a society or, more formally, are humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction", according to North (1990:3). 
Institutional theory has demonstrated its power to predict organizational changes 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1996), organizational strategies (Peng, 2003), the co-evolution 
of organizations and organizational fields (Hoffman, 1999) and also international 
business activities, such as international trade flows (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; 
Koukhartchouk and Maurel, 2003; De Groot, Linders, Rietveld and Subramanian, 2004; 
Ederington, Levinson and Minier, 2005) and foreign investment patterns ( Fatehi and 
Safizadeh, 1989; Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova, 1998; Hejazi and Safarian, 2002; 
Henisz, 2000; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; Loree and Guisinger, 1995; 
Wei, 2000). However, there is relatively more literature focusing on the effects of 
"formal institutions" namely, governmental institutions (laws and regulations), compared 
with literature on informal and social institutions, such as the information infrastructure, 
public trust and business professional institutions (e.g., accounting standards) (Shaomin 
Li and Filer, 2007). 
The governance environment is conceptualized as the "macro social, political, 
legal and economic institutions that shape and constrain micro governance behavior in 
social, political, and economic exchanges" (Li and Filer, 2007: 82-83). It is a concept 
implied in North's (1990) institutional theory and includes both formal and informal 
social rules. A relatively concise but powerful typology of institutional governance 
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systems is the two-category framework of governance environments (rule-based versus 
relation-based), first proposed by Shuhe Li and later on expanded upon by others (Shuhe 
Li, 1999; Shaomin Li, Park, and Shuhe Li, 2004). When public ordering is effective and 
efficient, people reply on public ordering to protect their interests in social exchanges, 
this mechanism is called rule-based governance. By contrast, when public ordering is 
lacking and the enforcement of laws and regulations is not very efficient, people reply on 
extended social networks to protect their interests, which is called relation-based 
governance. However, this framework receives criticism from scholars. As Shaomin Li 
(2009) later acknowledges, the two categories are far from sufficient to cover all the 
countries in the world. What this framework left unexamined is that there are many 
countries that have neither effective public ordering nor extensive informal social 
networks. Li (2009) interacted non-rule-based governance (societies without public 
ordering) with particularized trust (described in detail in a later section) and advanced a 
third category—neither-based governance (described in detail in a later section). For 
instance, according to Li's (2009) new classification, Argentina, Brazil and Russia are 
neither highly rule-based nor highly relation-based. They belong to "neither-based" 
societies. 
Li's (2009) interaction is very novel and creative. It gives rise to a new category 
of governance environment—neither-based. However, he did not explain the theoretical 
background of this interaction. This paper builds on his classification and tries to interpret 
the theoretical logic of his interaction, using institutional theory and transaction cost 
economies. In societies without effective public ordering, extended particularized trust, 
which knits people into intensive social networks, in fact, plays the role of institution and 
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fills the "institutional voids". Extended particularized trust, on the other hand, reduces the 
transaction costs among economic transactions. 
Since this three-category governance framework is new, it gives rise to another 
gap in literature—how does the interaction of governance environment and particularized 
trust affect international trade and foreign investment? Or, in other words, how do rule-
based, relation-based and neither-based governance affect international trade and foreign 
investment? 
This paper will take use of institutional theory and transaction cost economies to 
explain the interaction of non-rule-based governance with particularized trust. By doing 
this, this study will contribute to the governance literature with a new category of 
governance. In addition, it will apply this new category of governance environment to 
explain international trade patterns and foreign investment flows. Therefore, this paper 
will add itself into literature focusing on the quality of both formal and informal 
institutions and also literature in explaining the different patterns of foreign trade and 
investment. 
2.2 A Framework of Governance Environments 
2.2.1 Three-category Framework of Governance Environments 
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in 
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is 
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and 
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if 
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it 
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becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of 
settling disputes, but will look for a private method. This institutional environment is 
referred to as governance environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social 
institutions that together facilitates or constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in 
a society (Li and Filer, 2007). Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or 
norms. The institutional or governance environment includes institutions, organizations, 
and the resulting enforcement characteristics. Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a 
framework that classifies the governance environment across countries into two 
categories—rule-based and relation-based—in terms of how people protect their property 
rights and contracts. 
Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and 
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve 
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a 
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following 
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies, 
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and rule-
enforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information 
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and 
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the 
legal infrastructures, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and 
powerful enforcement branch, which is costly and takes a long time to build. This 
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing 
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North 
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1990, 2005). According to Li (2009), countries such as Finland, Sweden and the United 
States are examples of rule-based societies (shown in Table 1). 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society has 
the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and government 
regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the legislative, 
judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are controlled by 
the ruler(s); and public information is controlled by the state and is untrustworthy. 
Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that there exist closely knit 
informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections to protect themselves 
and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and governed by well-
functioning social networks maintained by private players, the relation-based governance 
system incurs few fixed costs compared to the high fixed-cost structure of the rule-based 
system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to lessen potential 
prosperity by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange, and to restrict 
impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). According to Li (2009), some good examples 
of relation-based societies are China, Indonesia and Vietnam (shown in Table 1). 
Neither-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the traditional 
framework by introducing a third category of governance environment—neither-based, 
also called family-based (in this study, we use them interchangeably). He argued that a 
country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there are 
some countries that have neither strong public rules, nor extensive informal social 
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networks to conduct and protect business. According to Li (2009), some examples of 
neither-based countries are India, Argentina and Russia (see Table 1). 
2.2.2 Generalized Trust and Particularized Trust 
Li (2009) identifies an important factor that distinguishes relation-based from 
neither-based societies—the dominant type of particularized trust. Broadly speaking, 
there are two types of trust in terms of who people trust: generalized trust and 
particularized trust (Uslaner, 2002, 2004). People who hold generalized trust believe that 
most people, including strangers, can be trusted. When people have very little confidence 
or faith in strangers, they rely on people whom they know well, such as family members 
or close friends. Such a trust is called particularized trust. The level of particularized 
trust people place on different relationships varies. The closest is among the direct 
members of the family—spouse, parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins, 
and other close kinship may be the next circle. The third circle usually includes friends, 
neighbors and co-workers. 
Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors, 
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and 
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal 
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. Such countries having 
a relatively high level of extended particularized trust are relation-based. In contrast, 
societies with extremely low levels of trust, where people predominantly rely on family 
members to conduct business and to protect property rights, are referred to as neither-
based (family-based) societies. This environment is expected to lessen potential 
prosperity the most by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange and to be the 
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most restrictive for impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). The typology of 
governance environment is shown in Figure 1. 
[Please insert Figure 1 about here] 
2.2.3 The Institutional and Transaction Cost Perspective of Governance System 
Institutions include both formal and informal constraints (North, 1990). Formal 
constraints include political rules, judicial decisions, and economic contracts. By contrast, 
informal constraints include socially sanctioned norms of behavior, which are embedded 
in culture and ideology (Scott, 1995). In situations where formal constraints fail, informal 
constrains will come into play the role to reduce uncertainty and provide constancy to 
organizations (North, 1990). 
Rule-based societies are in situation when formal constraints work. The public 
ordering is effective and the enforcement is efficient. In contrast with "rule-based", we 
can call societies when formal constraints fail "non-rule-based". In some non-rule-based 
societies, personal relations come into play the role of institutions, for example, guanxi in 
China (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Guanxi works as a substitute for formal institutional 
support (Xin and Pearce, 1996) and is useful in "the regulation of transactions in the 
absence of state institutions for that purpose" (Redding, 1990, p. 56). This idea is hardly 
new and has been tested a lot (Boisot, 1986; Coleman, 1993; Fallers, 1965; Putname, 
1993; Riggs, 1964; Walder, 1986; Xin and Pearce, 1996). 
As Li (2009) stated, the strong guanxi culture comes from the extended 
particularized trust. Take China as an example, everyone must have his or her circle of 
close friends to survive. The members of circles help each other in social interactions and 
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exchanges. In each circle, people know each other very well. The Chinese society can be 
viewed as consisting of numerous circles. Resource people are the ones who belong to 
multiple circles. Because of highly particularized trust, members in one group will trust 
people from another group if they are introduced by these resource people. Through this 
powerful introduction, one member begins to know people from another circle, and then 
more circles are linked together and become a broader network. This network plays the 
role of institution in non-rule-based societies. 
The cost structures of rule-based and relation-based governance systems are 
different (Shuhe Li, 1999; Li et al., 2004; Shaomin Li, 2009), which is shown in Figure 2. 
Basically, these scholars agreed that a well functioning rule-based system requires a large 
investment (high fixed cost) in the legal infrastructures. Once the infrastructure is built 
and functioning, the incremental cost to make another transaction is minimal (low 
marginal cost). By contrast, in a relation-based society, business can thrive with minimal 
social order (low fixed cost). However, with business expands, the extra cost to make 
another transaction increases (high marginal cost). 
From a transaction cost perspective, the rule-based system works well when the 
scale of economy is large, while relation-based governance works best when the 
economic scale is small. In neither-based societies, formal institutional is missing and 
there is no extended particularized trust playing the role of institution. People reply on 
only their nuclear family members to do business, which leads to difficulty in expanding 
business. The business scale is very limited and the transaction cost is high (as shown in 
Figure 3). 
11 
[Please insert Figure 2 and 3 about here] 
2.3 Literature Review 
Recently, as the use of the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to examine 
social, economic, and business behavior increases, scholars in international business 
begin to examine how institutional quality affects international business, such as 
international trade and foreign investment. 
On the side of international trade, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have been 
among the main contributors to extend governance environment to international trade. 
They examine how enforcement of the legal system affects import demands. They 
present evidence that corruption and poor contract enforcement in a country increases the 
insecurity of selling to that country, thereby reducing international trade. Koukhartchouk 
and Maurel (2003) introduce variables reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of 
potential trade effects for Central and Eastern European countries. De Groot, Linders, 
Rietveld and Subramanian (2004) adopt a comprehensive dataset developed by Kaufman, 
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which includes the data sources used by Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) and Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003). De Groot et al. (2004) 
capture the country-specific effect of governance on trade and also examine the bilateral 
influence of governance similarity on patterns of trade. Li and Samsell (2009) adopt a 
framework of governance environment and characterize these environments (institutional 
matrixes) into rule-based and relation-based. They examine the effect of rule-based and 
relation-based governance environments on international trade flows. 
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Scholars have also begun to pay increasing attention to the macro environment in 
a society and to its effect on investment. One of the main focuses is on how different 
governance environments, such as the legal system, affect the willingness of investors to 
invest and how investments are protected. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) found that countries with better legal systems tend to have a small number 
and diversified investors. English and Moore (2002) found that when a firm announced 
its investment in a country with ambiguous property rights, its stock value actually was 
affected negatively. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found that governance 
infrastructure—including the nature of the legal system— is an important determinant of 
FDI. Specifically, countries with a more impartial and transparent legal system and better 
protection of property rights tend to attract more FDI; countries lacking a good legal 
system and adequate protection of property rights attract less FDI. Li and Filer (2007) are 
among the first to examine the effect of governance environments on the variation of FDI 
and FPI (Foreign Portfolio Investment). They used a relatively new framework of 
governance environment, rule-based and relation-based and found that in countries with a 
weak rule-based governance environment, investors prefer direct investment to indirect 
investment, because the former can be better protected by private means. 
These studies provide valuable insights into the powerful influence of the quality 
of a country's institutions on international trade or foreign investment. However, they 
focus on formal institutions and ignore the influence of "informal rules". Furthermore, 
these studies do not distinguish between institutional environments that promote trade 
and foreign investment and those that do not. Based on this argument, this paper will use 
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the latest three-category framework of governance environments to analyze difference in 
trade and foreign investment across countries. 
Besides, this three-category framework is advanced by interacting particularized 
trust with non-rule-based governance. Since extended or nuclear particularized trust is the 
differentiator of relation-based and neither-based societies, trust will come to play roles 
in international trade and foreign investment. In fact, there is a very few studies exploring 
the role of trust in international business. Bhardwaj, Dietz and Beamish (2007) are among 
the first. They argued that higher levels of trust facilitates relationships and reduces 
perceptions of transaction costs and thereby attracts FDI. Thus, countries with higher 
levels of trust should attract more inward FDI. However, their empirical results did not 
support this statement. The main reason of their failure is that they did not distinguish 
between generalized trust and particularized trust, or in the other words, trust most people 
or trust only those one know well. "Interpersonal trust" they argued, in fact, is 
particularized trust. However, they used generalized trust level of a country to make their 
empirical analysis. Our paper distinguishes generalized trust and particularized trust. We 
believe that it is generalized trust differentiating relation-based and neither-based 
societies and we also argue that extended particularized trust will reduce transaction costs 
of a society, and therefore plays a role in international trade and foreign investment. 
2.4 Theory and Propositions 
2.4.1 Entry barriers for outsiders 
Firms selling goods to a foreign country face many barriers, including tariffs, 
quotas, restrictive laws and regulations, and other informal constraints (Hill, 2005). As 
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we stated in the former section, in rule-based societies, the trade laws and regulations are 
relatively clear, effective, and universally applied. Both outsiders and insiders are subject 
to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or permits. Both them 
can acquire this information from public channels and sources. 
By contrast, the situation in non-rule-based societies will be greatly different. In 
non-rule-based societies, the public ordering is less clear and less fair and the 
enforcement tends to be corrupt and inefficient. Given institutions as "the rules of the 
game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape 
human interaction" (North, 1990: 3), and institutional framework as "the set of 
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that established the basis of 
production, exchange, and distribution", lacking of public ordering is called "the 
institutional voids" by Khanna and Palepu (1997). 
In relation-based societies, or societies with extended particularized trust, people 
trust not only their family members, but also their neighbors, friends and friends' friends. 
For instance, Tang (2005) found that the most important trust sources of Chinese are 
neighbors and friends, rather than only one's own family. In China, the guanxi culture is 
very strong. Everyone must have his or her circle of close friends. Extend particularized 
trust knit different circles into an informal social network (Li and Wu, 2010). People 
reply on this extended informal social network to conduct social interactions and 
exchanges. This informal social network plays the role to fill the institutional voids. 
Insiders have extended particularized trust with each other and tightly knit with 
each other through informal networks. These networks are very powerful. If one person 
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cheats another one in his/her circle, he/she will be kicked out from this circle and 
furthermore from the entire network. This strong deterrence will ensure that he/she will 
not cheat. Because the "behavioral repertoires (in high trust societies) are based towards 
cooperation, rather than opportunism" (Hill 1990: 511), trust play the ex-ante role to 
reduce the opportunism (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). In addition, trust also enhances ex-
post efficiency (Arrow, 1974; Ouchi, 1981; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997) by lowering costs, such as monitoring cost and costs due to opportunistic 
behavior by agencies. 
On the other side, outsiders are totally different from both institutional and 
transaction cost perspectives. For outsiders, they still face the situation institutional voids. 
They have nothing to rely on to conduct their business and protect their property rights. 
Because they are out of contact from any circle or network, they cannot get trust from 
insiders. As a result, they face higher transaction cost such as monitoring costs and costs 
due to opportunist behavior. 
Neither-based societies, according to Li (2009), are those societies lacking of both 
effective public orderings and extended particularized trust. Because of lacking effective 
public ordering, neither-based societies are also in the situation of institutional voids. 
People tend to trust their family members only to conduct business transactions and 
protect their interests. Insiders will be limited to a small group of family members. 
If foreign countries who want to trade with focal countries, is just like outsiders 
want to do business with the insiders. In rule-based societies, the trade laws and 
regulations are relatively clear, effective, and universally applied. Both outsiders and 
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insiders are subject to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or 
permits. In relation-based countries, laws and regulations regarding trade are opaque and 
applied differently depending on the relationship of the prospective trader within the 
authorities. Outsiders find it is difficult to break in because developing relationships are 
costly. Even worse, neither-based societies are more restrictive than relation-based 
because the economic cooperation is limited to family members only. 
From a transaction cost perspective, rule-based governance works best when the 
economic scale is large while relation-based governance works best when the economic 
scale is small (shown in Figure 3). Thus, it will be easier to sell to rule-based than to 
relation-based governance societies. With extended particularized trust, relations are 
based towards cooperation, rather than opportunism. Trust is associated with expectations 
of reduced opportunism by others (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). Perceptions of monitoring 
costs are likely lower in societies with extended particularized trust than societies with 
nuclear particularized trust (Bhardwaj, Dietz and Beamish, 2007). 
Based on these arguments, we argue that: 
PI: It is the least difficult (least costly) to trade with rule-based countries. . 
P2: It is the most difficult (most costly) to trade with non-rule-based countries 
without extended particularized trust (neither-based countries). 
2.4.2 Protection types outsiders may resort to: FDI vs. FPI 
As we stated in a former section, direct investment allows an investor to govern 
his/her own assets and thus direct investment is easier for investors to protect than 
portfolio investment. Rule-based societies have well-established information 
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infrastructure, fair and efficient public ordering and effective enforcement systems. If 
only from the perspective of protection, there is no difference between direct investment 
and portfolio investment to foreign investors. 
Non-rule-based societies (both relation-based and neither-based societies) are in 
the situation of institutional voids. Foreign investors do not have fair public ordering, 
transparent information infrastructure and effective enforcement systems to rely on and 
protect their investment. From institutional theory, investors make investment into non-
rule-based countries will be more likely to choose direct investment. 
In fact, Bhardwa, Dietz and Beamish (2007) argued that there is positive 
relationship between FDI and trust level in a country. They argued that trust leads to 
"spontaneous sociability" (Fukuyama, 1995: 29) and enables individuals and firms to 
form cooperative relationships. Spontaneous sociality also enhances the speed of 
relationship formation and reduces the opportunism. Furthermore, because of high trust, 
the perception of monitoring costs is likely lower. In addition to providing ex-ante 
attractions to foreign investors, trust also enhances the ex-post efficiency by lowering 
monitoring cost and costs due to opportunist behavior. The trust they proposed, in fact, is 
particularized trust3. Follow them, we believe that highly particularized trust can enable 
spontaneous sociability, enhance relationship formation and reduce opportunism, and 
thus trust can low monitoring cost. Therefore, we argue that when foreign investors make 
investment to societies with extend particularized trust (relation-based societies) they are 
more likely to choose FDI. 
3
 They did not distinguish particularized trust and generalized trust. The trust they proposed, in fact, is 
particularized trust. But they use generalized trust to measure it, which is one of the reasons that their 
statement is supported only partially. 
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One of the reasons that the argument of Bhardwa et al. (2007) is only partially 
supported is because they did not distinguish different types of countries. As we argued 
in the former paragraph, countries with extended particularized trust will attract FDI. 
However, in neither-based governance, the particularized trust level is very low, but 
because of institutional voids, foreign investors are more likely to choose foreign direct 
investment to protect their investment. In other words, in neither-based countries, the 
particularized trust is low, but the FDI ratio is high. Therefore, there is a negative 
relationship between trust level and relatively FDI ratio in some countries (neither-based 
countries), which is opposite to their argument. In fact, different from relation-based 
countries, where particularized trust comes to play the role of institution, neither-based 
countries are in absolutely institution voids. When investors make investment into 
neither-based countries, they are more likely to choose FDI to take their investment under 
control and furthermore providing protection, compared to when they make investment 
into relation-based countries. Based on these arguments, we would like to propose that: 
P3: It is the most likely for foreign investors to choose foreign direct investment when 
they invest into non-rule-based countries without extended particularized trust 
(neither-based countries). 
P4: It is the least likely for foreign investors to choose foreign direct investment when 
they invest into rule-based countries. 
A summary of our theoretical propositions is located in Table 2 and the 
theoretical framework can be seen from Figure 4. 
[Please insert Table 2 and Figure 4 about here] 
19 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This study applies a framework of governance environments to explain 
differences in international trade and foreign investment across countries. Institutional 
theory plays an important role in predicting industrial and corporate practices (e.g. 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Hoffman, 1999; Peng, 2003). A relatively concise but 
powerful typology of institutional governance systems in institutional and political 
economy literature is a dichotomy between rule-based and relation-based governance. 
However, this dichotomy leaves some countries unexamined (Li, 2009). Li (2009) 
interacted non-rule-based governance with extended particularized trust and advanced a 
third category of governance—neither-based. This paper interprets this governance from 
transaction cost and institutional perspectives and introduces its difference from rule-
based and relation-based societies. In relation-based societies, extended particularized 
trust knit people into thick social network which plays the role of institution. Because of 
extended particularized trust, relations are based on cooperation, rather than opportunism 
which also reduce transaction costs. Neither-based societies lack of extended 
particularized trust, therefore transaction costs will be higher. 
Besides, this paper applies this three-category governance environment 
framework to explain differences in international trade and foreign investment and puts 
forward four propositions. Basically, we argue that rule-based societies are the easiest to 
enter for outsiders (making international trade), relation-based societies are the next 
easiest, and neither-based societies are the most difficult to enter. Similarly, foreign 
investors are most likely to choose foreign direct investment when they invest in neither-
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based societies and are least likely to choose foreign direct investment when they invest 
into rule-based societies, compared to when they invest into relation-based societies. 
This paper is among the first to introduce this third category of governance— 
neither-based governance. This advancement will contribute to the institution and 
political economy literature. Present literatures ignore neither-based societies or mix 
neither-based societies with relation-based societies. In fact, there are a large number of 
countries which have neither efficient public ordering nor a thick social network. To a 
large extent, most of these countries are relatively less developed and are in greatest need 
to promote their international trade and attract foreign investment. 
This study provides important policy implications for those neither-based 
countries, in addition to the contributions to the literature. We suggest that when making 
international trade, in considering trade policies, governments should pay close attention 
to the governance environments to evaluate their own and their trading partners' 
situations. When making foreign investment, investors should consider governance 
environments carefully to choose their investment mode and protect their investment. 
The implication is that countries with low levels of international trade that are trying to 
promote trade must not only evaluate their trade policies, but also evaluate their 
governance environment. Similarly, countries with low levels of foreign investment must 
evaluate their governance environment. A policy can be changed relatively quickly, but it 
will take much longer to change the governance environment, especially its cultural 
components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and the multinational 
companies must realize and be prepared to deal with. 
21 
Chapter 3: Why Some Countries Trade More, Some Trade Less, Some Trade 
Almost Nothing: The Effect of the Governance Environments on Trade Flows 
3.1 Introduction 
There are extensive studies about the importance of international trade in 
economic development by both scholars and policy makers who have convincingly 
shown that freer trade leads to higher welfare for a country. However, an unsolved yet 
important issue ever lingering in this area is why some countries trade more than others 
even after taking economic development and trade policy into consideration. Indeed this 
question has motivated many scholars of trade to search for answers. Recently, Li and 
Samsell (2009) used a relatively new framework of governance environment which 
classifies countries into rule-based and relation-based environment to examine its effect 
on trade flows and found that rule-based countries have larger trade flows than relation-
based countries. 
While Li and Samsell (2009) made a contribution in bringing the governance 
environment into the model predicting trade flows, a major drawback of their governance 
framework is that it is limited to two types of countries in the world: rule-based and 
relation-based. As Li (2009) later acknowledges, the two categories are far from 
exhaustive to cover all the countries in the world. Countries that have strong public 
ordering (i.e. rule-based) usually are the ones with mature market systems and advanced 
democracy, such as the United States and Western European countries. Countries that 
lack public ordering and yet have extensive informal (privately ordered) social networks 
(relation-based) include many Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, and Indonesia. 
Left unexamined in the Li-Samsell framework is many countries that have neither public 
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ordering nor extensive informal social networks. For instance, according to Li's (2009) 
new classification, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia are neither highly rule-based nor 
relation-based. Many of the least developed countries, such as some of the low-income 
African countries, may also belong to this "neither" category. As a matter of fact, this 
group includes the largest number of countries, but gets relatively little attention from 
both policy makers and academic scholars. More importantly, these countries can benefit 
significantly from increased trade, as shown in the following statistics. 
If we group trade volume according to the more updated governance classification 
by Li (2009) (namely, rule-based, relation-based, and neither-based), we can clearly see 
that some significant differences exist among the three types of countries (see Table 3). 
The most striking fact is that the average trade volume per capita of neither-based 
countries is the lowest, and the gap between them and their rule-based and relation-based 
counterparts is substantial. Rule-based countries trade three and 10 times more than 
relation-based and neither-based countries, respectively. 
[Please insert Table 3 about here] 
Why do the neither-based countries trade so little? Is it because of their low 
economic development level, their geography, and culture, as the previous literature 
suggests, or does the governance environment play a role? If the governance environment 
plays a role, why is it so? 
To attempt to fill these gaps in the literature, we adopt the new classification of 
governance environments developed by Li (2009) to explain why some countries trade 
more, some trade less, and some other countries trade almost nothing with other countries. 
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3.2 Theory Development and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 The literature on trade flow 
Scholars and policy makers have long recognized the importance of international 
trade. Smith's (1776) absolute advantage theory, Ricardo's (1817) comparative 
advantage theory - later refined by Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) - establish the 
theoretical foundation for productivity and prosperity increases resulting from 
specialization and free trade. In the 1980s, these free trade theories were challenged by 
the so-called new trade theorists, who argued that in highly concentrated industries where 
increasing returns to scale exist at a global level, the benefit of government intervention 
may outweigh the cost for a country. However, even the new trade theorists recognized 
the difficulty of applying such a theory and concluded that free trade still seems to be the 
best policy choice (e.g. Krugman, 1987). 
Empirically, numerous studies have provided evidence to support various trade 
theories. The explanatory factors from these studies are summarized in Markusen, Melvin, 
Kaempfer and Maskus (1995) and include differences in production functions, 
differences in factor endowments, returns to scale, differences in consumer tastes and 
preferences, and market distortions. Studies somewhat related to the governance 
environment effect on trade tend to examine the distortive effects of taxes, quotas, and 
subsidies. Examples of these studies include Melvin (1970, 1979, 1982), Magee (1971), 
and Parry (2001). 
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What is conspicuously missing from the earlier empirical study on the trade flows 
is how the institutional environment of a country affects the trade flows to and from the 
country. 
More recently, as the use of the institutional perspective (North, 1990) to examine 
social, economic, and business behavior increases and offers insights in studies of 
international business behavior and outcome, trade scholars begin to examine how 
institutional quality affects trade. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) have been among the 
main contributors to extend governance environment to international trade. They examine 
how enforcement of the legal system affects import demands. They present evidence that 
corruption and poor contract enforcement in a country increases the insecurity of selling 
to that country, thereby reducing international trade. Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003) 
introduce variables reflecting institutional quality into the analysis of potential trade 
effects for Central and Eastern European countries. De Groot, Linders, Rietveld and 
Subramanian (2004) adopt a comprehensive dataset developed by Kaufman, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (2002), which includes the data sources used by Anderson and 
Marcouiller (2002) and Koukhartchouk and Maurel (2003). De Groot et al. (2004) 
capture the country-specific effect of governance on trade and also examine the bilateral 
influence of governance similarity on patterns of trade. 
Li and Samsell (2009) acknowledge that these studies provide valuable insights 
into the powerful influence of the quality of a country's institutions on trade. But they 
also argue that these studies focus on formal institutions and ignore the influence of 
"informal rules". Furthermore, these studies do not distinguish between institutional 
environments that promote trade and those that do not. Based on these arguments, Li and 
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Samsell (2009) adopt a framework of governance environment and characterize these 
environments (institutional matrixes) into rule-based and relation-based. They examine 
the effect of rule-based and relation-based governance environments on international 
trade flows. 
This paper builds on Li and Samsell's (2009) study and uses a more recently 
developed framework of governance environment, distinguishing not only rule-based and 
relation-based environments, but also characterizing those environments that are neither 
rule-based nor relation-based. We use this new framework to examine the effect of these 
newly characterized environments on international trade flows. 
3.2.2 Governance environments 
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in 
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is 
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and 
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if 
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it 
becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of 
settling disputes. It becomes more likely they will look for a private way to solve 
exchange disputes. This institutional environment is referred to as governance 
environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social institutions that facilitate or 
constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in a society (Li and Filer, 2007). 
Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or norms. The institutional or 
governance environment includes institutions, organizations, and the resulting 
enforcement characteristics. Scholars have begun to pay attention to how institutional 
environments affect economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997). 
Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a framework that classifies the governance 
environment across countries into two categories—rule-based and relation-based—in 
terms of how people protect their property rights and contracts. 
Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and 
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve 
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a 
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following 
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies, 
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and rule-
enforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information 
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and 
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the 
legal infrastructures, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and 
powerful enforcement branch, which is costly and takes a long time to build. This 
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing 
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North 
1990, 2005). 
Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society 
has the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and 
government regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the 
27 
legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are 
controlled by the ruler(s); and public information is controlled by the state and is 
untrustworthy. Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that there exist 
closely knit informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections to protect 
themselves and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and governed by 
well-functioning social networks maintained by private players, the relation-based 
governance system incurs few fixed costs compared to the cost structure of the rule-based 
system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to lessen potential 
prosperity by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange, and to restrict 
impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). 
Neither-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the traditional 
framework by introducing a third category of governance environment—neither-based, 
also called family-based (in this study, we use them interchangeably). He argued that a 
country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there are 
some countries that have neither strong public rules, nor extensive informal social 
networks to conduct and protect business. Li (2009) identifies an important factor that 
distinguishes relation-based with neither-based societies—which is the dominant type of 
particularized trust. 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of trust in terms of who people trust: 
generalized trust and particularized trust. People who hold generalized trust believe that 
most people, including strangers, can be trusted. When people have very little confidence 
or faith in strangers, they rely on people whom they know well, such as family members 
or close friends. Such a trust is called particularized trust. The level of particularized 
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trust people place on different relationships varies. The closest is among the direct 
members of the family—spouse, parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins, 
and other close kinship may be the next circle. The third circle usually includes friends, 
neighbors and co-workers. 
Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors, 
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and 
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal 
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. Countries having a 
relatively high level of extended particularized trust are relation-based. In contrast, 
societies with extremely low levels of trust, where people predominantly rely on family 
members to conduct business and to protect property rights, are referred to as neither-
based (family-based) societies. This environment is expected to lessen potential 
prosperity the most by increasing marginal transactions costs per exchange and to be the 
most restrictive for impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005), and thus to be the most 
restrictive for trade. 
3.2.3 Trade flow and governance environment 
Firms selling goods to a foreign country face many barriers, including tariffs, 
quotas, restrictive laws and regulations, and other informal constraints (Hill, 2005). In 
rule-based societies, the trade laws and regulations are relatively clear, effective, and 
universally applied. Different from relation-based environments, both outsiders and 
insiders are subject to the same requirements and procedures to apply for trading rights or 
permits. Besides, the cost structure of rule-based societies—high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs—encourages more participants in trade. Dixit (2003) shows that private 
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enforcement (relation-based) "prevails only in a sufficiently small world". External 
enforcement (rule-based) "is useful only if the world is sufficiently large". 
By comparison, laws and regulations regarding trade in relation-based societies are 
opaque and applied differently depending on the relationship of the prospective trader 
within the authorities. According to Li et al. (2004), relation-based economies are 
characterized by closed market sectors dominated by insiders, and outsiders find it is 
difficult to break in because developing relationships are costly. 
Similarly, in neither-based countries, people do not have too much confidence or 
faith in anyone. But in order to conduct business, they have to rely on someone, usually 
family members. Thus, neither-based governance is more restrictive than relation-based 
because the economic cooperation is limited to family members only (tending to limit 
trade to personal trade), which is not usually the most efficient choice (Li, 2009). 
Comparing the three types of governance environment and their effects on trade flows, 
we hypothesize as follows: 
HI: Rule-based countries have more international trade than relation-based and family-
based countries. 
The above differences between rule-based and relation-based countries lead to 
different levels of difficulty (marginal cost) in trade. The opaque laws and regulations 
that favor insiders in relation-based society make relation-based markets difficult for 
outsiders to enter, whereas the transparency and universal application of laws and 
regulations in rule-based markets ensure a more level playing field for both inside and 
outside traders. Li and Samsell (2009) find that it is less costly for a trader from a 
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relation-based country to enter a rule-based market than vice versa. In this study, we will 
retest this argument. 
H2: It is easier (less costly) for a relation-based country to export to a rule-based 
country than vice versa, so relation-based countries export more to rule-based countries 
than to other relation-based countries. 
De Groot et al. (2004) argue that countries tend to trade with countries with similar 
institutional framework, because the time and costs of learning new rules and regulations 
(marginal costs) are minimal for those partner countries that have similar institutions. Li 
and Samsell (2009) find empirical evidence that countries with a larger gap in the scores 
of governance environment index (GEI, see the detailed explanation in the method 
section) or that have less similar governance environments tend to trade less. But they 
argue that it does not mean that countries with more similar institutions trade more. To 
resolve this issue, we retest this argument in this study. 
H3: Countries with more similar governance environments trade more with one another 
than countries with more dissimilar governance environments, ceteris paribus. 
As Li and Samsell (2009) point out, De Groot et al.'s (2004) findings are only 
partially true. The marginal transaction costs (learning, information, enforcement) 
between rule-based countries tend to be low, but not between relation-based, or neither-
based trading partners. Once again, trading laws and regulations in rule-based societies 
are clear, effective, and universally applied. While the forms of checks and balance may 
vary, they all share some key commonalities, which help to reduce marginal transaction 
costs between their partners. However, different relation-based societies may resort to 
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totally different types of relation-based governance mechanisms. It is difficult for 
outsiders to break in. Thus, even though two countries both have relation-based 
environments, the marginal transaction cost may be still high. It takes a long time and 
great effort to build relationships. Meanwhile, a trader's good relationship with some 
powerful players in one country can not be transferred to another relation-based country, 
although a trader's experience in cultivating private relationships with powerful players 
in a relation-based country may help him or her to do the same in new relation-based 
economies. Similarly, people in neither-based societies resort to family members in order 
to protect their interest or to conduct business. This governance mechanism is even more 
difficult for outsiders to enter than the relation-based governance mechanism. Therefore, 
we argue that: 
H4: Trade flows between two highly rule-based countries are greater than trade flows 
between two highly relation-based countries (as well as between two highly neither-
based countries), ceteris paribus. 
H5: Trade flows between two highly relation-based countries are greater than trade 
flows between highly neither-based countries, ceteris paribus. 
Informal rules such as social norms are an important part of the institutional 
environment of a society. Social norms promoting honesty and trust reduce transaction 
costs and promote exchange (North 2005). Trust is an important determinant of 
cooperation between strangers in a society and therefore of performance of social 
institutions. Trust is also particularly important for the performance of large organizations 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). Lack of trust could bring some 
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negative effects. From the perspective of political system, a higher level of generalized 
trust means that people have confidence that others will abide the rule of law and 
cooperate in maintaining it. This will make a pluralistic political system such as 
democracy work more efficiently. However, the lack of generalized trust creates more 
friction in the political and economic activities in a country, which, in turn, makes 
economic activities less efficient (Li, 2009). Li and Wu (2010) found that high levels of 
trust in a society could help to mitigate the negative effect of corruption on economic 
development. In a society with a high trust level, corrupt officials feel comfortable to 
accept bribes from almost everyone. If officials deliver goods to people with the highest 
bribe, it is likely to be "efficiency improving" corruption, because this briber usually is 
the most efficient one so that he/she can offer the highest bribe. When the society lacks 
trust, corrupt officials limit bribery to their families and close friends, who usually are not 
the most efficient economic players. Similarly, neither-based societies are characterized 
by a lack of extended particularized trust. Because of the lack of trust, economic 
cooperation is limited to a much smaller number of people (maybe family members only), 
which usually are not the most efficient choices. Thus, we argue that 
H6: All other things being equal, it is most difficult (most costly) to trade with a family-
based country. 
3.3 Methods 
In this section, we will introduce how data is collected, how variables are measured, 
and how data is analyzed. 
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3.3.1 Measuring governance environment 
The Governance Environment Index (GEI) developed by Li and Filer (2007) 
consists of five indicators: political rights; rule of law; quality of accounting standards; 
free flow of information; and public trust. Each of the five components of the GEI is 
standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation (SD) of one by subtracting the 
mean from the value and then dividing by the SD of the values. The standardized 
components are then summed to calculate the GEI for each country. A high GEI indicates 
a country is more rule-based, while a low GEI indicates a country is more relation-based. 
Li and Filer calculated the GEI for 44 countries for which all the five indicators are 
available. 
Li (2009) updated Li and Filer's (2007) GEI index and further improved their 
classification into three categories (rule-based, relation-based, and neither-based societies) 
with the addition of particularized trust. Li used the same five indicators but with data for 
2005 and 2006. Similar to Li and Filer (2007), he calculated the GEI for 45 countries for 
which all of the five indicators are available (See Table 4). On Table 4 there are 22 
countries which have positive GEI index scores and 23 countries which have negative 
GEI index scores. Since the average GEI is 0, a positive GEI country can be roughly 
thought as rule-based, and a negative GEI score means the country is less rule-based. 
However, it does not mean that it must be relation-based (Li, 2009). Some countries may 
be governed by extensive informal social networks. Some may have neither public rules, 
nor extensive informal social networks. Li (2009) recognizes a key indicator that can 
distinguish more-relation-based with non-relation-based countries—the trust level in a 
country. 
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By examining the dominant type of particularized trust, Li (2009) distinguishes 
relation-based countries from non-relation-based countries. He performs a cluster 
analysis of countries with negative GEI scores by using criteria including generalized 
trust, indicators trust of family, friends, and people one meets for the first time. The result 
of the cluster analysis is shown in Table 5. 
[Please insert Table 4 and Table 5 about here] 
On average, as compared to those in Cluster 2, Cluster 1 countries have (1) a 
higher level of generalized trust; (2) a slightly lower level of trust on family, and (3) a 
higher level of trust on neighborhood and people one meets for the first time. They fit 
our description of a relation-based country. In comparison, Cluster 2 countries have 
slightly higher trust on family and lower trust on other trust measures. These are 
countries in which most people do not rely on public rules or extended private relations. 
Li (2009) also confirmed this clustering pattern by simply ranking these countries 
by one of the most discriminating trust questions from World Value Survey 2005, 
Question V47, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got 
a chance, or would they try to be fair?" Relation-based countries have a higher 
percentage of respondents who believe that people try to be fair (see Table 6). 
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
3.3.2 Data on Trade flows 
Following Li and Samsell (2009), we include all the countries for which the GEI is 
available in our empirical analysis (45 countries; see Table 2). As can be seen from Table 
2, these countries represent a mix of countries with different development levels from all 
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major continents without systematic biases toward countries of a certain development 
level or geographic concentration. We collected the trade data from the United Nations 
Comtrade Statistics Database (United Nations, 2009). Import is the total volume of 
imports in US dollars to the importing country (I) from the exporting country (E). 
Imports are averaged by country for only the available data for the years 2005, 2006, 
2007, and 2008. The averaging is to minimize the effect of any reporting deficiencies and 
fluctuations in the data. The UN Comtrade database does not include data for Taiwan, 
leaving 44 countries. The bilateral trade flows among 44 countries would generate 1892 
(44x43) possible trade relationships. There are seven cases of no trade relationships, 
leaving 1885 observations of imports flows between two countries. 
3.2.3 Estimation Model 
Following Li and Samsell (2009), we use an OLS gravity model with commonly 
used country-specific variables to estimate the country-specific GEI effect and the effect 
of trading partners' GEIs. This method allows us to use the country-specific GEIs for 
both the importing and exporting countries, which is the main interest of our study, while 
controlling for the effects of the factors that were found to influence trade flows in the 
literature. We use the gravity model from Rose, Lockwood and Quah (2000) specified 
generally as follows: 
WXS) = /?0 + A lntfF,) + J32 ln(^7y /Pfi) + fi3 InZ), + PnGovn + PmFactorm + s.. 
where i and j denote the reporting and partner countries. The variables are defined as: Xy 
is the bilateral trade between the reporting and partner countries, Y is real GDP, P is 
population, Dy is the distance between the reporting and partner countries, Govn are 
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governance environment measures, and Factorm are the other control variables listed in 
the earlier section and more fully described in Table 7. 
[Please insert Table 7 about here] 
3.4 Findings 
We first calculate simple statistics and run a correlation matrix (see Table 8) for all 
independent variables in order to identify any high correlations that may cause 
multicollinearity. The highest correlation is between GEI and the log of GDP per capita, 
which is about .74. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated for each 
independent variable to test for multicollinearity. All VIF values are well below the 
cutoff of 10 which suggests possible harmful multicollinearity (Kennedy, 2003), and so 
we rule out any multicollinearity concerns. 
[Please insert Table 8 and 9 about here] 
Table 9 summarizes our data analysis using six model specifications with 
different GEI variables (Model 1 to Model 3d, which will be explained in more detail 
below). The R-squared for these models ranges from 0.673 to 0.704, and the F-statistics 
range from 182.7 to 268.3 and are statistically significant (p<.001), indicating that the 
models fit the data quite well. To facilitate our discussion of the results, below we will 
present our data analysis model by model. 
Model 1 uses the importer's (receiver) GEI labeled RGEI and the exporter's 
(partner) GEI labeled PGEI to estimate the OLS model. The coefficients for RGEI and 
PGEI are both positive and highly significant (at the p<0.001 levels), strongly supporting 
HI that rule-based countries trade more. 
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Model 2 uses the absolute gap (ABSGAP) between the GEIs of the trading 
countries' (the importer's and the exporter's). The coefficient estimate for ABSGAP is 
positive but not significant. Thus H3 is not supported. This is an important finding 
because it shows that the original classification of governance environment into two 
dichotomous groups may not capture all the major effects of governance environment on 
trade patterns. While GEI can distinguish countries with strong public ordering with high 
GEI scores (i.e. rule-based) from the countries with absence of strong public rules (low 
GEI scores), it cannot separate the countries with low GEI scores further into relation-
based and neither-based countries, which may have different trade flow patterns. A new 
dimension may be needed to distinguish the two so that we can examine how the 
difference affects trade flows, which is the main purpose of our study, namely, to 
overcome the drawback of previous studies that argued that countries with similar 
institutional environments tend to trade more (De Groot et al., 2004), or countries with 
different institutional environments tend to trade less (Li and Samsell, 2009). Our 
findings show that their arguments are only partially true. 
Model 3 uses nine combinations of GEI relationships between the three types of 
trade partner countries. The first three letters denote the exporting country's type and the 
later three letters designate the governance type of the importing country. Among them, 
"Rul" means rule-based countries, "Rel" means relation-based countries, and "Fam" 
means family-based countries. For example, "RulRel" means trade flows from rule-
based countries to relation-based countries. "FamRul" indicates trade flows from family-
based countries to rule-based countries. We use the unlabelled middle countries as the 
default category. 
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We further test the sensitivity of Model 3 using various GEI cutoff points defined 
as the number of standard deviations (SD) (with one SD=3.40) centered on the mean 
(which is -0.01). For example, Model 3 use 0.75 SD as the cutoff point (i.e., excluding 
the middle segment between the 0.75 SD cutoff points and retaining the observations in 
the two tails, with the top tail (0.375 SD above the mean) labeled as rule-based countries 
and the bottom tail (0.375 SD below the mean) as relation-based). This yields 56 percent 
of the observations in the middle with 44 percent of the observations in the two tails. As 
can be seen from Table 7, the cutoffs include 0.50 (SD), 0.75 (SD), 1.00 (SD) and 1.50 
(SD), showing in the Model 3a, Model 3, Model 3c and Model 3d. Model 3a has the 
largest number of rule-based countries along with the largest number of relation-based 
countries, and the fewest neither-based countries. Model 3d has the fewest number (but 
the strongest) of rule-based countries along with the fewest number (but the strongest) of 
relation-based countries, and the most neither-based countries. 
Throughout the four models, the coefficient estimates for RulRul, RulRel, RelRul, 
and RelRel are all positive and significant. The effects of other combinations of 
governance types that involve a family-based (or neither-based) (i.e., whether importing 
from family-based countries or exporting to family-based countries, including RulFam, 
RelFam, FamRul, FamRel and FamRel) on trade flows are all negative and highly 
significant. These results provide strong support for H6 that trade is difficult (more costly) 
with family-based countries. 
The coefficient estimates for RulRel and RelRul in all four models are positive 
and significant, and there is no significant difference between the coefficient estimates 
for RelRul and RulRel in Models 3a and 3, implying that that the governance-related 
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marginal trading costs are similar for relation-based countries selling (exporting) to rule-
based countries and the other way around. However there is a larger difference in 
Models 3c and 3d which include the strongest rule-based countries and the strongest 
relation-based countries. Therefore, H2 is only supported in Models 3b and 3c. 
Interestingly, this finding is not consistent with Li and Samsell (2009). Li and Samsell 
(2009) found that the governance-related costs are different between RulRel and RelRul; 
the coefficient was positive for RulRel and negative for RelRul. But their finding was 
based on a misclassified relation-based group for they inappropriately included neither-
based countries in the former. The difference they captured was actually caused by the 
neither-based countries. Now once we distinguish these three groups, the cost difference 
between rule-based to relation-based and relation-based to rule-based is only different for 
the strongest rule-based countries versus the strongest relation-based countries. 
H4 and H5 argue that trade flows between two highly rule-based countries will be 
greater than trade flows between two relation-based countries or two neither-based 
countries. Again, the coefficient estimate for RulRul is positive and highly significant 
(pO.OOl). In all four models (Model 3a, 3, 3c and 3d), RelRel are positive and 
significant. However, contrary to the findings by Li and Samsell (2009), there is no 
substantial difference between the coefficient estimates of RulRul and RelRel in Models 
3a and 3, but the difference is substantial in Models 3c and 3d. In other words, the effects 
of the governance environment on trade flows are both positive and strong between two 
rule-based countries or between two relation-based countries; but the effects are most 
positive and significant for trade between the strongest rule-based countries. Thus H4 is 
only supported in Models 3c and 3d which include only the strongest rule-based countries 
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and the strongest relation-based countries. Once again, when we separate neither-based 
countries from the relation-based group, the difference between rule-based and relation-
based countries becomes trivial in Models 3a and 3. In all four models (Model 3a, 3, 3c 
and 3d), FamFam are all negative and significant, lending strong support for H5. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Recently scholars have begun to use the characteristics of the institutional or 
governance environment to examine trade flows. Li and Samsell (2009) bring a new 
aspect of governance environment into the literature. They examine the effect of 
institutional environment quality on trade patterns and explore the different influences of 
rule-based and relation-based governance environments on trade. However, Li and 
Samsell left out a large number of countries which have neither strong public ordering or 
extended social networks. This group of countries is relatively poor but large in number. 
Accelerating their economic development is not only in the best interest of these 
countries, but also contributes positively to the world economic order and world peace. 
Unfortunately, the reasons why they trade so little has received little attention from trade 
scholars. 
Our study fills this gap in the literature by paying special attention to this category 
of countries. Drawing on Li's (2009) updated framework of governance environment, we 
add neither-based governance environment to the analysis of trade flows across countries. 
Combined with rule-based and relation-based governance environment, this paper 
examines how the governance environment affects international trade flows among the 
three types of countries. 
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We find that that being classified as a neither-based country has a negative effect 
on trade flows, which means that both import and export of neither-based countries tend 
to be relatively low. The major reason for this pattern is the lack of trust in these societies, 
which prevents the establishment of informal, relation-based social networks which may 
function as an effective governance mechanism when formal public rules and 
enforcement are lacking. An effective governance mechanism is necessaiy for conducting 
trade and the governance vacuum in the neither-based countries makes trade difficult. 
This important discovery helps explain the puzzle as to why some countries trade 
almost nothing, which the previous literature has failed to explain even after taking into 
account low GDP level and other barriers such as culture, geography, and legal systems. 
We show that the institutional environment explains why there are still many countries 
that trade little thereby limiting their productivity and prosperity even though it is widely 
known that trade improves welfare. 
Our findings imply that increasing the level of rule-based governance from 
relation-based or neither-based in a country can increase trade flows. We also find that 
countries with dissimilar governance environments do not necessarily trade less, which is 
different from former studies (De Groot et al., 2004; Li and Samsell, 2009). We find that 
countries with similar higher levels of rule-based governance environments (the RulRul 
trade relations) tend to trade more with one another, and is the highest between the 
strongest rule-based countries. Trade flows will also be high if it is between two relation-
based countries (the RelRel trade relations), but trade between the strongest relation-
based countries will not be as high as between the strongest rule-based countries. If the 
trade is between two neither-based countries (the FamFam trade relations), the effect of 
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governance environment on trade flows is the most negative. In other words, countries 
with similar neither-based governance environments tend to trade the least with one 
another. 
In addition to the contributions to the literature, our study provides important 
policy implications. Our findings suggest that in considering trade policies, governments 
should pay close attention to the governance environments to evaluate their own and their 
trading partners' trading situations. The finding that rule-based and relation-based 
countries tend to trade more and neither-based countries tend to trade less is important for 
policy makers. All countries, regardless of their governance environment, trade less with 
neither-based countries. The implication is that countries with low levels of international 
trade that are trying to promote trade must not only evaluate their trade policies, but also 
evaluate their governance environment. A trade policy can be changed relatively quickly, 
but it will take much longer to change the governance environment, especially its cultural 
components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and the trading 
companies must realize and be prepared to deal with. 
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Chapter 4: Foreign Direct Investment vs. Foreign Portfolio Investment: the Effect 
of the Governance Environment 
4.1 Introduction 
Foreign investment has been increasing rapidly in both volume and the number of 
participating countries. It has been an engine of economic growth worldwide and thus has 
been a major subject of research for scholars of international business. 
However, there are some deficiencies in the literature. First, most studies of 
foreign investment have been focused on foreign direct investment (FDI), whereas 
foreign indirect investment, or foreign portfolio investment (FPI), has been largely 
ignored (Li and Filer, 2007). This leads to the second gap in the literature. The 
relationship between foreign direct investment and indirect investment has not been 
sufficiently examined. When the proportion of FDI over total foreign investment into a 
country and the level of rule of law of the receiving countries are plotted, it is clear that 
countries with a low level of the rule of law have a higher proportion of FDI (Li and Filer, 
2007). Third, the effect of governance environments that lack the rule of law has not been 
sufficiently examined. Recently, Li and Filer (2007) used a relatively new framework of 
governance environments which classified countries into rule-based and relation-based 
environments to examine its effect on the proportion of FDI and found that rule-based 
countries have a smaller FDI proportion than relation-based countries. 
While Li and Filer (2007) made a contribution in bringing the governance 
environments into the model to predict the relative size of FDI and FPI, a major 
drawback of their governance framework is that it is limited to two types of countries: 
rule-based and relation-based. As Li (2009) later acknowledged, the two categories are 
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far from exhaustive. Countries that have a strong public ordering (i.e. rule-based) usually 
are the ones with mature market systems and advanced democracy, such as the United 
States and Western European countries. Countries that lack public ordering and yet have 
extensive informal relation-based social networks include many Asian countries such as 
China, Taiwan, and Indonesia. Left unexamined in the Li-Filer framework are the 
countries that have neither public ordering nor extensive informal social networks. For 
instance, according to Li's (2009) new classification, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia are 
neither highly rule-based nor relation-based, which he terms "family-based" (we will 
explain it in more detail later). Many of the least developed countries, such as some of 
the low-income African countries, may also belong to this third category. In fact, this 
group includes the largest number of countries, but receives relatively little attention from 
both policy makers and scholars. More importantly, these countries are large in number 
and can benefit significantly from increased foreign indirect investment, as we will show 
later. 
If we group foreign investment according to the more updated governance 
classification by Li (2009) (namely, rule-based, relation-based, and family-based), we can 
clearly see that some interesting differences exist among the three categories of countries 
(see Table 10). There is almost no difference among these three types of countries in the 
FDI volume they attract. However, when we compare the FDI as a proportion of total 
foreign investment, the average FDI proportion of family-based countries is the highest, 
and the FDI ratio of relation-based and family-based countries is almost twice of that in 
rule-based countries. 
[Please insert Table 10 about here] 
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Why do the family-based countries attract so little indirect (portfolio) investment? 
Is it because of their low economic development level, their geography, and culture, as 
the previous literature suggests, or does the governance environment play a role? If the 
governance environment plays a role, why is it so? 
To attempt to fill these gaps in the literature, we adopt the new classification of 
governance environments developed by Li (2009) to explain why some countries attract 
more and some attract less FDI. 
4.2 Theory Development and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Mode of investment: direct versus indirect 
Foreign investments include two categories: direct investment and portfolio 
investment. In portfolio investment, investors invest capital only for a return through 
purchasing securities, such as stocks and bonds. By contrast, in direct investment, 
investors invest capital into a firm for not only a return but also participation the 
management of the firm. Thus, the major difference between direct and portfolio 
investment is control (Ball, McCulloch, Frantz, Geringer, and Minor, 2002, p. 69). 
Generally, if an investor controls 10% or more shares of a firm, it is direct investment 
(Bell et al., 2002, p.69; Hill, 2003, p.204). However, the line between direct and portfolio 
investment is increasingly blurred. In literature, "portfolio investment" is used more 
commonly. But in this paper, we may use "indirect investment" and "portfolio investment" 
interchangeably to contrast the directness and indirectness of the two modes of 
investments. 
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In direct investment, the investor directly oversees his/her investment; he/she has 
firsthand information on the operations and does not need to rely on financial reports 
issued by someone else, such as an accounting firm or a board in which he/she has no 
control or access. Thus in direct investment, the risk of being misinformed or being 
expropriated by others is substantially reduced, even in a governance environment that 
lacks fair and efficient public ordering (e.g., low quality public financial information and 
weak financial regulation), an investor can still effectively protect his/her investment. 
Furthermore, if one has a good relationship with the ruler(s), the protection can be 
extremely effective and favorable. 
On the contrary, for portfolio investments, such as buying stocks and bonds in the 
secondary market, the investor has no direct control over his/her investment; nor does 
he/she have firsthand information about the operation. The lack of a good public 
governance environment is especially hazardous for such investment. First, in societies 
lacking in public ordering, there tends to be a dearth of reliable public information and a 
low level of general trust. Accounting and auditing standards are lower, the operations of 
publicly listed companies are less transparent, and financial information is easily altered 
by insiders. Second, due to the lack of checks and balances and the lack of freedom of the 
press, the political system in a society lacking of public ordering tends to be dominated 
by a powerful dictator (who tends to view the country as his private property [Olson, 
1993]). The state policies under such a dictator tend to favor industry leaders and big 
businesses that have strong relations with the dictator. This puts the minority 
shareholders, such as the portfolio investors, in a disadvantageous position. 
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4.2.2 The literature on foreign investment 
Foreign direct investment has been extensively studied by international business 
scholars. The early literature had provided a theoretical rationale for FDI mainly through 
the industrial organization economics research stream, e.g., costs of doing business 
abroad and internalization (Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969), firm specific competitive 
advantage (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1971), risk diversification (Rugman, 1979), 
product-life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966), and the eclective paradigm (Dunning, 1980). 
The "Uppsala Model", which posited an incremental international process (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), and the liability of foreignness 
that highlights the MNE subsidiary's disadvantages in the host country (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer, 1995) supplemented those approaches. These theories suggest 
various determinants of potential FDI patterns such as country-level determinants (e.g., 
economic and political stability, host government policies, market size, gross domestic 
product, cultural distance, tax rates, wages, corruption, and production and transportation 
costs [Hofstede, 1980; Nigh, 1985; Root and Ahmed, 1979]), industry-level determinants 
(e.g., sales growth, asset intensity, growth in the number of firms [Luo, 2001]), and firm-
level determinants (e.g., knowledge protection, global integration, host country 
experience [Luo, 2001]). 
In this paper, we focus on the effect of socioeconomic and political factors on 
patterns of FDI. In this research stream, some scholars draw on Dunning's eclectic theory 
to identify policy and non-policy factors that affect the FDI location choice (e.g., 
Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova 1998; Loree and Guisinger, 1995); some study FDI 
and trade patterns simultaneously by using the gravity model developed by international 
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trade economists (e.g., Hejazi and Safarian, 2002); and another sub-stream focuses on 
how political risks affect the FDI flow (e.g., Butler and Joaquin, 1998; Henisz, 2000). 
In recent years, scholars have begun to pay increasing attention to the macro 
environments in a society and to its effect on investments. One of the main foci is on how 
different governance environments, such as the legal system, affect the willingness of 
investors to invest and how investments are protected. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) found that countries with better legal systems tend to have a 
small number of diversified investors. English and Moore (2002) found that when a firm 
announced its investment in a country with ambiguous property rights, its stock value 
actually was affected negatively. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) found that governance 
infrastructure—including the nature of the legal system—is an important determinant of 
FDI. Specifically, countries with a more impartial and transparent legal system and better 
protection of property rights tend to attract more FDI; countries lacking a good legal 
system and less adequate protection of property rights attract less FDI. 
Although these studies examined how different governance environments affect 
the FDI patterns, they still did not directly address the relationship between direct and 
indirect investment. Three studies provided some insight into these issues. Itay and Razin 
(2005) found that there is a higher ratio of FDI to FPI in developing countries relative to 
developed countries. They argue that the hands-on nature of FDI investors enables them 
to obtain special information about the operations of the firm. However, the cost of this 
superior information possessed only by FDI investors is that FDI assets have a lower 
resale price. They use this argument to explain the variation of FDI and FPI in developed 
and developing countries. Albuquerque (2003) found that FDI is less volatile than other 
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financial flows such as FPL He explained that is because FDI is harder to expropriate 
under financing constraints. Li and Filer (2007) are among the first to examine the effect 
of governance environments on the variation of FDI and FPL They used a relatively new 
framework of governance environments, rule-based and relation-based and found that in 
countries with a weak rule-based governance environment, investors prefer direct to 
indirect investment, because the former can be better protected by private means. 
This study builds on Li and Filer's (2007) study and uses the latest framework of 
governance environments developed by Li (2009), distinguishing not only rule-based and 
relation-based environments, but also characterizing those environments that are neither 
rule-based nor relation-based. We use this new framework to examine the effect of these 
newly characterized environments on variation of foreign investment flows. 
4.2.3 Governance environments 
Governance is defined as a mechanism people use to protect their interests in 
social and economic exchanges (Li and Filer, 2007). The foundation for this definition is 
North's (1990) institutional theory. For example, in a society with a fair, open, and 
effective legal system, people will resort to the court or public arbitrations for a ruling if 
disputes arise. On the other hand, when the law is biased and judges are corrupt, then it 
becomes more likely that people will not choose the public rules as their means of 
settling disputes, but will look for a private method. This institutional environment is 
referred to as governance environment. It is the set of political, economic, and social 
institutions that facilitate or constrain the choice of governance mechanisms in a society 
(Li and Filer, 2007). Institutions include both formal rules and informal rules or norms. 
The institutional or governance environment includes institutions, organizations, and the 
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resulting enforcement characteristics. Scholars have begun to pay attention to how 
institutional environments affect economic growth (Keefer and Knack, 1997). 
Li, Park and Li (2004) introduced a framework that classifies the governance 
environment across countries into two categories—rule-based and relation-based—in 
terms of how people protect their property rights and contracts. 
Rule-based governance environment. In most developed societies, firms and 
individuals primarily rely on public rules—laws and government regulations—to resolve 
disputes and enforce rights and contracts. This reliance on public ordering is called a 
rule-based environment. A rule-based governance environment must satisfy the following 
conditions: the public rules governing economic exchanges (such as laws, state policies, 
and regulations) are fairly made; the rule-making, rule-adjudication, and rule-
enforcement are separate; rule-enforcement is fair and efficient; and public information 
infrastructure (such as accounting, auditing, and financial rating) is highly reliable and 
accurate. Thus, a well-functioning rule-based system requires a large investment in the 
legal infrastructure, including a law making body, a court system, and a credible and 
powerful enforcement branch, all of which are costly and take a long time to build. This 
environment is expected to be more conducive to trade and prosperity by reducing 
marginal transaction costs per exchange and to promote impersonal exchange (North 
1990,2005). 
Relation-based governance environment. In contrast, a relation-based society 
has the following characteristics: public rules (laws, government policies, and 
government regulations) are less fair; there are no checks and balances between the 
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legislative, judiciary, and executive branches of the government; courts and judges are 
controlled by the ruler(s); and public information is controlled or manipulated by the state 
and thus is untrustworthy. Another feature that is vital to relation-based society is that 
there exist closely knit informal networks. People tend to use these personal connections 
to protect themselves and to settle disputes. Because business could be conducted and 
governed by well-functioning social networks maintained by private players, the relation-
based governance system incurs few fixed costs compared to the high fixed-cost structure 
of the rule-based system. This environment is expected to be more restrictive for trade, to 
lessen potential prosperity by increasing the marginal transactions costs per exchange and 
to restrict impersonal exchange (North 1990, 2005). 
Family-based governance environment. Li (2009) expanded the Li-Filer 
framework (2007) by introducing a third category of governance environment. He argued 
that a country that is not rule-based may not necessarily be relation-based. In fact, there 
are some countries that have neither strong public rules nor extensive informal social 
networks to conduct and protect business. In such societies, people have little trust in 
others and rely primarily on their immediate family members for protection in business. 
Li (2009) called this type of governance environment family-based and identified an 
important factor that distinguishes the relation-based societies from the family-based 
societies—the dominant type of particularized trust. 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of trust: generalized trust and particularized 
trust. People who hold generalized trust believe that most people, including strangers, can 
be trusted. When people have very little confidence or faith in strangers, they rely on 
people whom they know well, such as family members or close friends. Such a trust is 
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called particularized trust. The level of particularized trust people place on different 
relationships varies. The closest is among the direct members of the family—spouse, 
parents, and children. Relatives such as in-laws, cousins, and other close kin may be the 
next circle. The third circle usually includes friends, neighbors, classmates, and co-
workers. 
Some particularized trust goes beyond family members and extends to neighbors, 
friends, and friends' friends. In China, for example, the guanxi culture knits friends and 
friends' friends into extended social networks. People rely on these extended informal 
social networks to conduct business and to protect property rights. In our framework, we 
use the term "relation-based" to describe countries with a relatively high level of 
extended particularized trust. In contrast to these countries, there are societies with 
extremely low levels of trust (including particularized trust), where people predominantly 
rely on family members to conduct business and to protect property rights. Behind their 
immediate family members, they essentially trust no one, and thus the term "family-based" 
is coined. This type of governance environment is viewed as having the biggest hurdle in 
achieving prosperity due to the even higher marginal transactions costs and being the 
most restrictive for impersonal (rule-based) exchange, such as investment that relies on 
public ordering (North 1990, 2005). 
4.2.4 Foreign investment and governance environments 
As stated above, direct investment allows an investor to govern his/her assets, and 
thus direct investment is easier to protect than indirect investment. As a result, when 
investing in an economy that is non-rule-based, people tend to choose more direct 
investment as opposed to portfolio investment for better protection of their investment 
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through private means. In contrast, rule-based societies, which have a well-developed 
public information infrastructure, a high level of public trust, and fair and efficient public 
protection, offer better protection for indirect (portfolio) investments than do non-rule-
based societies. As a result, rule-based societies tend to have a large portfolio investment 
market (such as publicly traded stock markets and bond markets). Thus, we hypothesize 
as follows: 
HI: Foreign investors are less likely to choose direct investment when they invest in 
rule-based societies and more likely to choose direct investment when they invest in 
relation-based in relation-based societies and family-based societies, ceteris paribus. 
H2: The size of the stock market relative to the size of the economy tends to be 
larger in rule-based societies than in relation-based societies and family-based societies, 
ceteris paribus. 
In relation-based societies, public rules are less fair because it is usually biased in 
favor of certain privileged groups; government operations are secretive; and public 
information and the media tend to be controlled and manipulated by the government. 
However, there is usually a thick and strong relational network. Neighbors, friends, and 
friends' friends are closely knit by extended particularized trust. If the investors have 
connections with the insiders (such as powerful politicians in the country), they can have 
access to insider information and enjoy informal and effective protection for their 
investment. 
Similar to relation-based societies, family-based countries lack trustworthy public 
information and effective public ordering. The legal system is not transparent or fair, and 
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the state is unable to enforce laws impartially. Different from relation-based countries, 
however, in family-based societies people do not have much confidence or faith in 
anyone. But in order to conduct business, they have to rely on some people, who are 
usually their family members. For example, in Russia, "The system is not based on law, it 
is based on personal connections, likes and dislikes, in many cases, on marriages" (BBC 
World Service Podcast, 2009). Obviously, it is virtually impossible or at least very 
difficult for outsiders to enter into a nuclear family circle. Logically, it is very difficult 
for investors to protect their investments, especially portfolio investment which relies 
primarily on public information (company financial report and public auditing) and the 
enforcement of the public rules for protection. Again, direct investment is less risky 
since the investor is also the manager who oversees his/her own assets. Thus the favored 
mode of investment in family-based societies tends to be the direct investment, and the 
portfolio investment market tends to be small relative to that in the rule-based and 
relation-based societies. Thus, we argue that: 
H3: Foreign investors are more likely to choose direct investment when they invest 
in family-based societies than in relation-based societies, ceteris paribus. 
H4: The size of the stock market relative to the size of the economy will be larger in 
relation-based societies than in family-based societies, ceteris paribus. 
4.3 Methods 
In this section, we will introduce how data is collected, how variables are measured, 
and how data is analyzed. 
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4.3.1 Measuring governance environments 
We have mentioned how to measure governance environments in Section 3.3.1 
and the results and process are shown in Table 4, 5 and 6. 
4.3.2 Dependent variables 
We use various dependent variables in our models to test above hypotheses. To test 
the foreign investment hypotheses (HI and H3), we specify the dependent variable as the 
share of foreign direct investment in relation to the economy's total foreign investment 
position (FDIFI) . Since we have constructed the total foreign investment measure as the 
sum of foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment, a smaller measure of 
FDI_FI suggests that foreign investment focuses on portfolio investment. 
To test the stock market hypotheses (H2 and H4), we specify a measure of market 
depth and size by using market capitalization. The first specification uses this 
capitalization measure relative to the economy's GDP (CAP_GDP). In an alternative 
specification, we also consider the market capitalization measure alone and we control 
for the size of the economy on the right-hand side. The full description of these variables 
and their sources are listed in Table 11. 
4.3.3 Control variables 
Our choices of control variables are based on previous studies. There is a rich 
literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) 
found that the foreign exchange rate affects direct investment flows and they also found 
that the existence of English common law in a country exerts a positive effect on 
attracting direct investment from the United States. La Porta et al. (1998) found that the 
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different legal traditions (English common law and different families of Continental law) 
have different effects on investor protection. Based on these two studies, which are most 
relevant to our studies, we include foreign exchange rate (FXRATE) and legal tradition 
index in our models. Following La Porta et al. (1998), we specify four legal traditions: (1) 
English common law tradition, (2) French civil law tradition, (3) German civil law 
tradition, and (4) Scandinavian civil law tradition. We use dummy variables to present 
the four legal families: ENGLAW, FREJLAW, GERLAW, and SCAJLAW (the 
default, or the omitted category is other countries with an unspecified legal tradition). To 
test the stock market hypotheses, we include GDP and the age of the stock market (AGE) 
as additional controls. 
Another control variable based on the previous literature is the openness variable in 
examining FDI hypotheses. In certain countries the investors may have no access to 
portfolio markets and thus any investment they make must be in the form of direct 
investment (Li and Filer, 2007). We add a dummy variable OPEN. OPEN is equal to 0 if 
any of the following controls on foreign investment exists: (1) ceiling on the percentage 
of foreign ownership in a particular stock, (2) restrictions on the repatriation of income 
and earned interest, or (3) direct control preventing entry of foreign investors into the 
market. OPEN equal to 1 if the market is accessible to foreign investors. 
When we test the stock market hypotheses (H2 and H4), we also create a dummy 
variable for Hong Kong. Hong Kong is a special case because it is strongly based on the 
English tradition with mature public rules and at the same time is heavily influenced by 
the Chinese relation-based culture. Furthermore, Hong Kong is a city-state whose 
economy highly dependent on international trade and finance. During the past decade, as 
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Hong Kong's manufacturing industry moved to the mainland, its service industry— 
mainly finance and trade—has grown rapidly and accounted for about 90% of the 
territory's GDP. Based on these reasons, we create a dummy variable for Hong Kong 
only.4 Detailed descriptions of all variables and their sources are shown in Table 11. 
[Please insert Table 11 about here] 
4.4 Findings 
We first calculate descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix (see Table 12) for 
all independent variables in order to identify any high correlations that may cause 
multicollinearity problem. The highest correlations in absolute value are between Rul and 
FDI_FI and between Rul and GEI, which are -0.86 and 0.86, respectively. But neither of 
these combinations is used in the same regression. The second highest correlation is 0.76 
between GEI and FDI_FI. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is calculated for each 
independent variable. All VIF values are well below the cutoff of 10 which rules out any 
multicollinearity concerns. 
[Please insert Table 12 about here] 
Tables 13 and 14 summarize our data analysis. Table 13 gives the data analysis 
results of the FDI hypotheses (HI and H3). Four specifications are used to examine these 
hypotheses and illustrate the robustness of the results. Model 1 examines the Li-Filer 
model (2007) of the influence of GEI, legal structure, exchange rate changes, the log of 
GDP and the openness of the financial market to possible portfolio flows on the log of 
4
 We run the models with and without the Hong Kong dummy variable. There are no significant differences 
between the two specifications in terms of the overall results of the models and the estimates of the 
variables of interests. 
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foreign direct investment (FDI). In Model 2, we use the same control variables as above 
and replace the influence of GEI with two dummy variables, Rel and Fam. Model 3 and 
Model 4 regress the dependent variable, the FDI to total foreign investment ratio, on the 
same set of independent variables used in Models 1 and 2. 
[Please insert Table 13 about here] 
The results for Model 1 and 2 illustrate the incomplete picture based on models 
with only FDI in absolute value as the dependent variable. The estimates of all 
governance environments measures, GEI, Rel and Fam, are insignificant. The governance 
environment cannot explain the flows of the total value of FDI. When the dependent 
variable is changed to relative size of FDI over total foreign investments (Models 3 and 
4), the two governance variables become highly significant and the adjusted R-squares 
increase dramatically (from around 0.2 in Model 1 and 2 to 0.7 in Model 3 and 0.8 in 
Model 4). In Model 3, the coefficient estimate of GEI, which is negative and highly 
statistically significant, shows that the more rule-based a country, the smaller FDI 
investment will be as a share of the total foreign investment. When GEI is replaced with 
two dummies (Rel and Fam) in Model 4, the coefficient estimates of both dummies are 
positive and highly statistically significant. In this model, the default is rule-based 
governance. It seems that in rule-based countries the FDI-total foreign investment ratio 
will be the smallest, compared to relation-based and family-based countries. So HI is 
strongly supported. 
Since both the estimates of the relation-based dummy and the family-based dummy 
are positive and significant and the estimate of the family-based is larger than that of the 
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relation-based, it is apparent that the family-based countries attract more FDI relative to 
total foreign investment than do relation-based countries, exactly as hypothesized in H3. 
To further compare the estimates of relation-based dummy and family-based dummy 
statistically, we rerun Model 4 and use the relation-based category as the default (shown 
in Model 4a). Compared with relation-based countries, rule-based countries attract 
significantly less FDI (relative to total foreign investment), which is consistent with HI. 
However, the estimate of family-based countries is positive but insignificant. This means 
that there is no significant difference between estimate of family-based and relation-
based countries. Thus, we cannot conclude that family-based countries attract more FDI 
(relative to total foreign investment) than do relation-based countries. Thus we cannot 
conclude that H3 is supported. 
Table 14 is the data analysis results of the stock market size hypotheses H2 and H4. 
To test these hypotheses, we use two alternative specifications of the size of the stock 
market: market capitalization of listed companies in U.S. dollars (CAP) and market 
capitalization of listed companies as a percentage of GDP (CAPGDP). In the models 
that use CAP (Model 5 and 6), we also control for the effect of GDP, since the 
capitalization of the market is likely to depend on the size of the economy. In all these 
models, we control for the length of time the market has existed as of 2006 (AGE). 
[Please insert Table 14 about here] 
Models 5 and 6 use absolute market capitalization as the dependent variable. 
Estimates of all governance environments measures, GEI, Rel and Fam, are insignificant 
once again, showing that governance environments cannot explain the absolute value of 
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market capitalization. However, when the dependent variable is changed to market 
capitalization as percentage of GDP (as in Model 7 and 8), the regressions are more 
significant and the adjusted R-squares increase markedly (from around 0.17 to around 
0.82). In Model 7, the estimate of GEI is positive and statistically significant, showing 
that the more a country relies on public ordering (more rule-based), market capitalization 
will constitute a larger share of its economy size. 
When GEI is replaced with two dummies (Rel and Fam) to measure governance 
environments in Model 8, estimates of both these two dummies are negative and 
statistically significant. In these regressions, the default effect is that of rule-based 
governance. It means that in rule-based countries, the relative market capitalization will 
be the highest, compared to relation-based and family-based countries. Consequently H2 
is supported. Estimates of the both dummies (Rel and Fam) are positive and significant, 
but the estimate of the relation-based dummy is relatively smaller than that of the family-
based dummy, implying that the market capitalization is greater in the family-based 
economy than it is in the relation-based economy. This is opposite to the direction we 
proposed in H4. Thus H4 is not supported. 
[Please insert Table 15 about here] 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Foreign investment has been extensively studied in the literature. However, most 
studies focus on foreign direct investment. Foreign portfolio investment has largely been 
ignored and the relationship between direct and portfolio investment is unexamined. In 
addition, the effect of governance environment, especially a governance environment that 
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lacks the rule of law, has not been sufficiently examined. Recently, Li and Filer (2007) 
bring a new aspect of governance environment into the literature. They examined the 
effects of institutional environment quality on foreign investment and explored the 
different influence of rule-based and relation-based governance environment on foreign 
investment. Li and Filer left out countries which have neither strong public ordering nor 
extended informal social networks. This non-rule-based and non-relation-based group of 
countries is relatively poor but large in number. Identifying factors that may hinder 
investment flows and effectively dealing with these factors is not only an academic 
exercise, but beneficial to the economic development in these countries and to foreign 
investors who are investing or plan to invest in these countries. Our study sheds light on 
this issue which has been largely unexamined by scholars. 
Our study fills this gap in the literature by focusing on this third group of countries. 
Drawing on Li's (2009) updated framework of governance environment, we add family-
based governance environment, along with rule-based and relation-based governance 
environment, to the analysis of the patterns of foreign investment across countries. 
We find that family-based countries tend to have a lower portfolio to total foreign 
investment ratio, much like relation-based countries. Our explanation for this pattern is 
that due to the lack of effective rule of laws, foreign investors prefer to participate in the 
management of their investment to reduce information noise and expropriation risks 
faced by portfolio investments. We also find that rule-based countries have the largest 
stock markets relative to their economies because of their better public ordering, the flip 
side of the very same reason that makes investors to choose direct investment in non-rule-
based countries. 
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Our rinding helps explain the puzzle why some countries attract relatively more 
FDI and others attract relatively more portfolio investment, a puzzle which the previous 
literature has failed to explain even after taking into account low GDP level and other 
barriers such as culture, geography, and legal systems. We show that the governance 
environment explains why there are still many countries that attract little foreign 
investment thereby limiting their productivity and prosperity even though it is widely 
known that foreign investment is the engine of economic growth worldwide. 
In addition to the contributions to the literature, our study provides useful policy 
implications. Our findings suggest that in formulating foreign investment policies, 
governments and investors should pay close attention to the governance environment. 
The finding that rule-based countries tend to have smaller FDI to total foreign investment 
ratios than that of family-based and relation-based countries is important for policy 
makers. The implication is that countries with low levels of foreign investment trying to 
attract investment should not only evaluate their investment policies, but also evaluate 
their governance environment. Foreign investment policies can be changed relatively 
quickly, but it will take much longer to improve the governance environment, especially 
its cultural components such as trust. This is a fact that both the government and 
multinational corporations must realize and be prepared to deal with. 
63 
References 
Albuquerque, R. (2003). The composition of international capital flows: Risk sharing 
through foreign direct investment. Journal of International Economics 61: 353— 
384. 
Anderson, J. and D. Marcouiller (2002). Insecurity and the pattern of trade: An empirical 
investigation. The Review of Economics and Statistics 84(2): 342-352. 
Arrow, K. (1974). The Limits of Organization, New York: Norton. 
Ball, D., W. McCulloch, P. Frantz, M. Geringer and M. Minor (2002). International 
business: The challenge of global competition, McGraw-Hill, Boston. 
Bhardwaj, A., J. Dietz, and P. W. Beamish (2007). Host Country Cultural Influences on 
Foreign Direct Investment, Management International Review, 47(l):29-50. 
Boisot, M. H. (1986). Markets and hierarchies in a cultural perspective. Organization 
Studies,!: 135-158. 
Bradach, J. L. and R. G. Eccles (1989), Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to 
Plural Forms, Annual Review of Sociology; 15:97-118. 
Buckley, P. and M. Casson (1976). The future of the multinational enterprise, Macmillan 
London. 
Butler, K. and D. Joaquin (1998). A note on political risk and the required return on 
foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 29: 599-608. 
64 
Caves, R. (1971) International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign 
investment, Economica, 38(149): 1-27. 
Coleman, J. S. (1993). The rational reconstruction of society. American Sociological 
Review, 58: 1-15. 
De Groot, H. L. F., G.-J. Linders, P. Rietveld, and U. Subramanian (2004). The 
Institutional Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns. Kyldos 57(1): 103-124. 
Deardorff, A. V. (1995) Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a 
neoclassical world?, NBER Working Paper. 
Delios, A., D. Xu, and P. W. Beamish (2005) Within-country diversification, host 
country institutions, and foreign subsidiary survival, Working paper, National 
University of Singapore, Singapore. 
DiMaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1991) (Eds) The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Dixit, A. (2003). Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement. The Journal of Political 
Economy 111(6): 1293-1317. 
Dunning, J. (1980) Toward an eclectic theory of international production: some empirical 
tests, Journal of International Business Studies 11(1): 9-31. 
Ederington, J., A. Levinson and J. Minier (2005) Footloose and pollution-free, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 8: 92-9. 
65 
English, P. and Moore, W. (2002). Property rights ambiguity and the effect of foreign 
investment decisions on firm value. In 2002 Index of economic freedom, G. 
Driscoll, K. Holmes, and M. O'Grady (Eds.). Washington, DC: The Heritage 
Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. 
Fallers, L. A. (1965). Bantu bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Fatehi, S.K. and M. Safizadeh (1989), The association between political instability and 
flow of foreign direct investment, Management International Review 29: 4-13. 
Fukuyama, Francis (1995). Trust. New York: Free Press. 
Gastanaga, V., Nugent, J., and Pashamova, B. (1998). Host country reforms and FDI 
inflows: How much difference do they make? World Development, 26: 1299-
1314. 
Globerman, S., and Shapiro, D. (2003). Governance infrastructure and U.S. foreign direct 
investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 34: 19-39. 
Greenwood, R. and Hinings, C. (1996). Understanding radical organizational change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism, Academy of Management 
Review, 21: 1022-1054. 
Grier, R. M. (1999) Colonial legacies and economic growth, Public Choice, 98: 317 - 35. 
Heckscher, E. (1919). The Effects of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income. 
Ekonomisk Tidskrift 21: 497-512. 
66 
Hejazi,W.,and Safarian, A. (2002). Explaining Canada's changing FDI patterns. Memo: 
University of Toronto. 
Henisz, W. (2000). The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization, 16: 334-364. 
Hill, C. W. L. (1990). Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications 
for Transaction Cost Theory, Academy of Management Review 15(3): 500-513. 
Hill, C. W. L. (2003). International business: Competing in the global marketplace (4th 
ed.), McGraw-Hill Irwin, Boston, MA. 
Hill, C. W. L. (2005). International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace. New 
York, McGraw-Hill. 
Hoffman, A. (1999). Institutional evolution and change: Environmentalism and the U.S. 
chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal, 42: 351-371. 
Hofstede, Geert. (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-
related values. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Hymer, S. H. (1960) The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct 
Foreign Investment, PhD Dissertation. Published posthumously. The MIT Press, 
1976. Cambridge, Mass. 
Itay, G., and Razin, A. (2005). Foreign direct investment vs. foreign portfolio investment. 
NBER working paper series. Working paper 11047. 
67 
Johanson, J. A. N. and Vahlne, J.-E. (1977) The internationalization process of the firm— 
A model of knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments, 
Journal of International Business Studies 8(1): 23-32. 
Johanson, J., and Wiedersheim-Paul, F. (1975) The internationalisation process of the 
firm: four Swedish case studies, Journal of management Studies 12(3): 305-322. 
Judge, William and Li, Shaomin (2008). Organizational design for foreign subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises: a contingency perspective based on governance 
environment and strategic role, working paper. 
Kaufmann, D., D. Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (2002). Governance matters II: Updated 
indicators for 2000-01.World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, Aart and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999), Aggregating Governance 
Indicators. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195. 
Keefer, P. and S. Knack (1997). Why don't poor countries catch up? A cross-national test 
of an institutional explanation. Economic Inquiry 35: 590-602. 
Kennedy, P. (2003). A Guide to Econometrics. Cambridge, The MIT Press. 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu (1997) Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging 
Markets, Harvard Business Review 75(4): 41-51. 
Kindleberger, C.P. (1969) American Business Abroad: Six Essays on Direct Investment, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 
68 
Kostova, Tatiana and Zaheer, Srilata (1999). Organizational Legitimacy under Conditions 
of Complexity: The Case of the Multinational Enterprise, Academy of 
Management Review 24(1): 64-81. 
Koukhartchouk, O. and M. Maurel (2003). Accession to the WTO and EU Enlargement: 
What Potential for Trade Increase? Center for Economic Policy Research. London. 
Krugman, P. R. (1987). Is Free Trade Passe? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 1(2): 
131-144. 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1997). Trust in large 
organizations. The American Economic Review 87(2): 333-338. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155. 
Li, Shaomin (2009). Managing International Business in Relation-based versus Rule-
based Countries. New York, Business Expert Press. 
Li, Shaomin and D. Samsell (2009). Why Some Countries Trade More Than Others: The 
Effect of the Governance Environment on Trade Flows. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review 17(1): 47-61. 
Li, Shaomin and J. Wu (2010). Why some countries thrive despite corruption: The role of 
trust in Bribery-Corruption Relations and Its Effect on Economic Performance. 
Review of International Political Economy 17(1): 129-154. 
69 
Li, Shaomin and L. Filer (2007). The effects of the governance environment on the 
choice of investment mode and the strategic implications. Journal of World 
Business 42(1): 80-98. 
Li, Shaomin, S. H. Park, Shuhe Li (2004). The Great Leap Forward: The Transition From 
Relation-Based Governance To Rule-Based Governance. Organizational 
Dynamics 33(1): 63-78. 
Li, Shuhe (1999). Relation-based versus rule-based governance: An explanation of the 
east asian miracle and asian crisis. Paper presented at the american economic 
association annual meeting in new york, January. Listed on the social science 
research network (<http://papers.Ssrn.Com/paper.Taf?Abstract_id=200208>), 
2000. Reprinted in review of international economics, 2003, 11(4): 651-73, 
American Economic Association Annual Meeting in New York. New York. 
Loree, D., and Guisinger, S. (1995). Policy and non-policy determinants of U.S. equity 
foreign direct investment. Journal of International Business Studies, 26: 281-299. 
Luo, Yadong(2001). Determinants of local responsiveness: Perspectives from foreign 
subsidiaries in an emerging market. Journal of Management, 27(4):451-477. 
Magee, S. (1971). Factor market distortions, production, distribution, and the pure theory 
of international trade. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 85(4): 623-643. 
Markusen, J., J. Melvin, KE Maskus, W Kaempfer (1995). International trade: Theory 
and evidence, McGraw-Hill. 
70 
Melvin, J. (1970). Commodity taxation as a determinant of trade. The Canadian Journal 
of Economics/Revue canadienne d'Economique 3(1): 62-78. 
Melvin, J. (1979). Short-run price effects of the corporate income tax and implications for 
international trade. The American Economic Review 69(5): 765-77'4. 
Melvin, J. R. (1982). The Corporate Income Tax in an Open Economy. Journal of Public 
Economics 17(3): 393-404. 
Nigh, D. (1985). The Effect of Political Events on US Direct Foreign Investment: A 
Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Analysis, Journal of International Business 
Studies, 16(1):1-17. 
North, D. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University. 
North, D., C (2005). Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton 
Economic History of the Western World, Princeton University Press. 
Ohlin, B. (1933). Interregional and International Trade. Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press. 
Olson, M. (1993), Dictatorship, democracy, and development, American Political 
Science Review 87: 567-576. 
Ouchi, W. G. (1981).Theory 2: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese 
Challenge, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
71 
Parry, I., W. H. (2001). The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor 
Tax Distortions. International Tax and Public Finance 8(2): 147-170. 
Peng, M. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of 
Management Review, 28: 275-296. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Redding, S. G. (1990). The spirit of Chinese capitalism. New York: de Gruyter. 
Ricardo, D. (1817). On The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London, John 
Murray. 
Riggs, F. W. (1964). Administration in developing countries. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Root, F. and A. Ahmed (1978) The influence of policy instruments on manufacturing 
direct foreign investment in developing countries, Journal of International 
Business Studies 9(3): 81-93. 
Rose, A. K., Lockwood, B. and Quah, D. (2000). One money, one market: The effect of 
common currencies on trade. Economic Policy, 15:7^-5. 
Rugman, A. M. (1979). International Diversification and the Multinational Enterprise, 
Lexington, MA, Lexington Books. 
Scott, W.R. (1995). Institutions and Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
London, W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 
72 
Tang, W., (2005), Public Opinion and Political Change in China, CA: Stanford 
University Press 
Uslaner, E. M., (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press, 
New York. 
Uslaner, E.M. (2004), Trust and Corruption, in Johann Graf Lambsdorf, Markus Taube, 
and Matthias Schramm, eds., Corruption and the New Institutional Economics 
(London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 76-92. 
Vernon, M. (1966) Experiments in visual perception: selected readings, Penguin Books. 
Walder, A. G. (1986). Communist neo-traditionalism. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Wan, W. P. and Hoskisson, R. E. (2003). Home country environments, corporate 
diversification strategies, and firm performance, Academy of Management 
Journal 46: 27-45. 
Wei, S. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors, Review of Economics 
and Statistics 82: 1-11. 
White, George O. Ill (2008). Relation-based strategic responses to volatile regulatory 
environments: Conceptual and empirical analyses of wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries in Southeast Asia. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at El 
Paso, United States — Texas. 
Xin, Katherine R and Pearce, Jone L (1996). Guanxi: Connections as substitutes for 
formal institutional support, Academy of Management Journal, 39(6): 1641-1658. 
73 
Xu, D. and Shenkar, O. (2002). Institutional distance and the multinational enterprise, 
Academy of Management Review 27: 608-618. 
Zaheer, S. (1995). Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness, Academy of Management 
Journal 38 (2): 341-360. 
74 






















Trinidad & Tobago 
Chile 






















































































































(Source: Li, 2009) 
Type: 1—rule-based, 2—relation-based, 3—neither-based. 
5
 This score is from one of the most discriminating trust questions in the 2005 World Value Survey, 
Question V47, "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
would they try to be fair?" l="try to take advantage of you", 2.. .6, 7="try to be fair." 
75 
Table 2. Summary of Theoretical Propositions 














Table 3. Classification and Comparison of Trade Volume of Different Countries 
Trade volume ($billions) Trade volume per capita 
Category N Mean S.D. F-value Mean S.D. F-value 
Rule-based 946 4.79 13.70 1.73 202.6 1,356.6 4.18 ** 
Relation-based 338 5.16 23.90 40.36 f 76.4 586.2 18.18 f 
Neither-based 601 1.32 3.51 19.0 41.8 
Total 1,885 3.75 14.20 121.4 996.0 
fP<0.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
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(Source: Li, 2009) 
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Table 5. Clustering of More Relation-Based Versus More Family-Based Countries on 
Trust 







































(Source: Li, 2009) 
(1 = more relation-based; 2 = more family-based) 
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(Scores are average answer by each country. High score means people in a 
country incline to agree that "people try to be fair", indicating the country is more 
relation-based; low score means people in a country incline to agree that "people 
try to take advantage of me," indicating it is less relation-based.) 
(Source: Li, 2009) 
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Imports. Import is the total volume of imports in U.S. 
dollars to the importing country (I) from the exporting 
country (E). The trade data is from the United Nations 
Comtrade Statistics Database (United Nations, 2009). 
Imports are averaged by country for only the available data 
for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The averaging is 
to minimize the effect of any reporting deficiencies and 
fluctuations in the data. 
GDP, Population, and GDP per capita. GDP is the average 
of the reported GDP in U.S. dollars for the three years 
2004, 2005, and 2006. The GDP and population data come 
from World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank, 
2008) and is averaged for the same three years. Population 
is the average of the reported population for the same three 
years. 
The GEI consists of five indicators: political rights; rule of 
law; quality of accounting standards; free flow of 
information; and public trust. Each of the five components 
of the GEI is standardized to a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one by subtracting the mean from the value 
and then dividing by the standard deviation of the values. 
The standardized components are then summed to 
calculate the GEI for each country. A high GEI indicates a 
country is more rule-based while a low GEI indicates a 
country is more relation-based. 
Distance. Previous studies have used the gravity model to 
capture the exponential effect of distance on the level of 
trade between two countries and the effect of the other 
independent variables. Deardorff (1995) examines the use 
of the gravity model for trade flow estimations involving a 
distance variable. We calculate distance using the "great 
circle equation" and the mid-country coordinates obtained 
from the CIA World Fact Book (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2008). The above studies consistently find 
distance, as a proxy for transportation costs, to be 
significantly inversely related to trade flows. Shared 
Borders, Island, Landlocked. In addition to distance, other 
geographical related variables have been used in past 
studies to represent effects on trading costs. The data for 
these variables come from the CIA World Fact Book 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). Countries sharing a 
common border, counties that are islands, and countries 
that are landlocked are represented with dummy variables. 








represented by language and religion, to be significant in 
explaining the overall level of bilateral trade flows. 
Language and religion are dummy variables set to 1 if 
countries match and zero if not. These variables, obtained 
from the CIA World Fact Book (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2008). 
Grier (1999). Former Colonial Relationship. As in prior papers, we 
control for possible trade effects between countries with a 
former colonial relationship using dummy variables. The 
designation of these relationships follows the listings in 
Grier (1999). 
EU27 Trade Agreements. Consistent with some of the earlier 
studies, we include control variables for membership in the 
agreements of EU 27 (the economic and political union of 
27 European countries).6 
6
 We did not control some other trade agreements such as WTO, NAFTA and EFTA because either most of 
our countries (only 1 or 2 left) belong to an agreement or only 1 or 2 countries belong to an agreement. In 
fact, Li and Samsell (2009) included all of these agreements and found that the average is either close to 1 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































fPO.001, ***P<0.01, **P<0.05, *P<0.1 
a Code: Exporter-Importer, for example, RelRul means trade flows from relation-based to rule-
based countries 
85 
Table 10. Classification and Comparison of Foreign Investment of Different Countries 











































F R E L A W 






Cumulative foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (billions of US$) 
(2005-2007 average). 
FDI as % of total foreign 
investment. 
Market capitalization of listed 
companies as % of GDP (2005-
2007 average). 
Market capitalization of listed 
companies (billions of US$) (2005-
2007 average). 
Governance Environment Index. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country is rule-based. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country is relation-based. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country is neither-based. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country's legal system originated in 
the English common law tradition 
(1998). 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country's legal system originated in 
the French civil law tradition (1998). 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country's legal system originated in 
the German civil law tradition 
(1998). 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if a 
country's legal system originated in 
the Scandinavian civil law tradition 
(1998). 
Gross domestic product (billions of 
US$) (2005-2007 average). 
Change in foreign exchange rate 
(local currency per US$), 2004-
2007. A positive FXRT means that 
the local currency is rising against 
the U.S. dollar. 
The number of years the stock 
Variable Description 
International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) (IMF, 2009). 
IFS. 
World Development Indicators 






La Porta et al. (1998). 
La Porta etal. (1998). 
La Porta etal. (1998). 
La Porta etal. (1998). 
IFS. 
WDI. 
International Encyclopedia of the 
87 
market had been in existence as of 
2006. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if 
none of the following foreign 
investment restrictions are in place: 
(1) ceiling on the percentage of 
foreign ownership in a particular 
stock, (2) restrictions on the 
repatriation of income and earned 
interest, or (3)direct controls 
preventing entry of foreign investors 
into the market. 
Dummy variable. It equals to 1 if the 
Stock Market 
(Sheimo, Loizou, and Aves, 1999). 
OECD's FDI regulatory 
restrictiveness index: revision and 
extension to more economies 
(OECD, 2006), Implementing the e-
APEC Strategy: progress and 
recommendations for further action 
(Lee, 2004) and country reports 
(UNCTAD for multiple years) 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Extent of Market 
Figure 2: The governance cost of rule-based and relation-based systems 




























P3, P4 + 
International trade 
Foreign Portfolio investment 
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